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What Lies Beneath? The Role
of Informal and Hidden Networks
in the Management of Crises
DENIS FISCHBACHER-SMITH AND MOIRA FISCHBACHER-SMITH∗
Abstract: Crisis management research traditionally focuses on the role of formal
communication networks in the escalation and management of organisational crises.
Here, we consider instead informal and unobservable networks. The paper explores
how hidden informal exchanges can impact upon organisational decision-making
and performance, particularly around inter-agency working, as knowledge distributed
across organisations and shared between organisations is often shared through informal
means and not captured effectively through the formal decision-making processes.
Early warnings and weak signals about potential risks and crises are therefore often
missed. We consider the implications of these dynamics in terms of crisis avoidance
and crisis management.
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INTRODUCTION
A striking characteristic of organizational life is that there is a lot of talk about
decisions, decisions that have been made, are to be made, will be made, should be
made, will never be made; talk about who makes decisions, when, how, why and with
what results. Organization members interpret a significant part of activities around
them in terms of decisions (Laroche, 1995, p. 67).
The processes of decision-making are central to accountability and control within
organisations. It is well known, however, that organisations tend to manage
what they can measure and that behaviours and reporting alter accordingly,
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often to the neglect of important but un-measurable information and activity
(Seidl, 2007; and Smith, 2005a). The focus on measurement encourages decision-
making that attends primarily to those activities that are known, visible and that
can be made explicit. Decision making in relation to risk and risk assessment
in particular, has become increasingly prominent in organisations due in part
to the reputational damage that can ensue following a crisis and from which
organisations have great difficulty recovering (Sipika and Smith, 1993; and
Smith and Irwin, 2006). Such assessment relies primarily on calculations of
probabilities and the consequences of particular hazards, and this process
becomes contextualised within information sharing about organisational risks.
This process often relies on experts and senior staff within the organisation
to calculate the nature of the risk. These groups draw mainly on hard data or
information that is known within the organisation around failure modes and
their effects. This information is then shared amongst decision makers. There
are, however, several problems with this approach.
Firstly, the process is more effective when the probabilities of failure are
known and the consequences are well understood. The approach has problems
when it is applied to low probability, high consequence events where the
frequency of occurrence is so low or the process is so new that there is uncertainty
around the statistical judgements of occurrence (Fischbacher-Smith, 2010).
Secondly, there are potential issues around the role that technical expertise
can play in the process as powerful interests can serve to distort the assessment
of risk under certain conditions (Collingridge, 1992; Collingridge and Reeve,
1986; and Smith, 1990). Thirdly, even where information is available about a
particular hazard, the decision-making process can also be shaped by judgement
of that risk which is based on informal or more qualitative information. We argue
here, that despite the use of such information and expertise, the distribution of
knowledge across and between organisations presents significant challenges to
organisations in the context of decision-making and risk management because
many of the early warnings of crises are shared through informal networks
that are both unobserved and potentially unobservable. It is for this reason
that organisations often only discover that many of these indications existed
about the potential for a crisis after the event. These warnings were either
undiscovered until after the event or had been discovered in advance but
were not fully understood or prioritised because they did not fit with the
decision making paradigm of the organisation (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). As
many of these early warnings exist within intra- and inter-organisational
networks, the challenge for management is that of identifying and managing
this otherwise hidden information amongst often unobserved and unobservable
networks and it is the nature of this challenge that forms the core of the
paper.
How information and knowledge informs the decisions that managers make,
is something which has been the subject of considerable research interest
(Argyris, 1990; Boisot, 1995; Collingridge, 1992; Collingridge and Reeve, 1986;
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and Seidl, 2007). Of importance within this literature has been the role of
socio-technical networks in shaping the supply of information, verifying and
challenging assumptions around decision parameters, and in identifying early
warnings of the potential failures associated with particular decisions (Ballinger,
et al., 2011; Cross et al., 2006; and Jansen et al., 2011). In many respects,
socio-technical networks are a central dynamic of organisational performance,
particularly in the context of human services such as healthcare (Doolin, 1999).
Here, an organisation’s dynamic capabilities (Augier and Teece, 2008; and
Barreto, 2010) are a function of the individuals and teams that interact together
to deal with the demands of the ‘problem space’ (Boisot, 1995; and Boisot
and Child, 1999) as well as the ways in which the organisation communicates
information, structures its knowledge management processes, and develops its
staff. The nature of the information and data that is provided, and the processes
through which it is analysed and stored, are important elements in shaping how
effectively organisations manage this information space and make decisions in
the process.
The recent Europe-wide crisis around the contamination of processed foods
illustrates the nature of the problem well. In January 2013, beef products in
the UK and Ireland, were found to contain significant proportions of horsemeat
(Castle and Dalby, 2013; Meikl et al., 2013; Meikle and McDonald, 2013; and
Williams, 2013). This horsemeat had made its way into food supplied in hospitals
and schools, despite public sector procurement regulations and quality control
processes. The subsequent testing by government agencies revealed this to be
an endemic problem within the European Union (Leake et al., 2013; Linchfield
et al., 2013; and Meikle et al., 2013) and highlighted the difficulties associated
with auditing information surrounding the international production and transfer
of food products. What became evident from the early stages of this crisis was
that financial drivers were a key factor in shaping behaviours in a globalised
supply chain. The crisis also illustrated the problems associated with a weak
regulatory framework (or at least one that was weakly enforced) and a range
of issues around auditing compliance. The horsemeat crisis was not the only
event to illustrate problems around regulation and compliance. The death of
patients at mid-Staffordshire hospital (in the UK) (Francis, 2010), the so-called
‘horsemeat scandal’ (Castle and Dalby, 2013; Leake et al., 2013; and Thomson,
2013), and the presence of non-clinical grade silicone in breast implants (Berry
and Stanek, 2012; and Freshwater, 2012) also highlighted the problems around
accountability and control against a backdrop of economic pressures.
In human services, such as health care, where organisations are heav-
ily dependent on their human capital to achieve effectiveness, knowledge,
information, data and decision making can be seen as being largely co-
produced with other organisations involved such as social care, education,
and third sector agencies providing social support (Osborne, 2006 and 2009).
As such, the quality of the human, relationships between service providers
(which are often informal), and between these providers and their consumers
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(or patients) also significantly influences the nature of organisational perfor-
mance and effectiveness. Much of the literature on service provision emphasises
these interactions in terms of improving service integration, strengthening
inter-agency cooperation, and clarifying protocols between agencies so as to
reduce gaps in service provision. Some stimulus for this has arisen out of cases
concerning child protection and older people’s services, especially those where
the system was deemed to have failed a vulnerable child or older person. Such
services have often provided a focus on the difficulties associated with this
network of co-production especially in relation to communicating problems or
near misses, or following up on concerns as early warnings. Both children’s and
older people’s services are particularly good examples because protection and
care depends almost entirely on effective inter-agency (health and social-care)
working. Information flows and knowledgemanagement are thus often identified
as processes where failures can occur around early warnings and near-miss events
(Rasmussen, 1982 and 1983; Reason, 1990 and 1997; and Turner, 1976 and 1978).
Within this literature, however, little attention has been given to the substantial
limitations organisations have in controlling informal information sharing and
decision making between networked organisations and thus the vulnerabilities
networks can create.
Our aim here, therefore, is to consider how networked service organisations
rely on informal human interaction as an essential conduit of information and
knowledge exchange, and to illustrate how these interactions often remain
unobservable and uncontrollable by managers, thus having significant potential
to directly cause and/or escalate crises. Drawing on both inter-organisational
theory and the extensive body of work in crisis management, we examine
how vulnerability may be created and early warnings ignored and we consider
the implications of informal networks for managerial intervention, contingency
planning, and managerial control. Before exploring these processes further, we
first need to outline some of the key factors around the management of risk and
the limitations of control.
RISK, CONTROL AND UNOBSERVABILITY
Risk is typically understood in terms of estimating both the likelihood and the
consequences of a particular event occurring (see for example, Royal Society,
1983 and 1992). Risk management is concerned with the processes of identifying
areas of potential hazard, reducing the probability of their occurrence and
mitigating the remaining potential vulnerability that exists in relation to that
risk. Residual risks are ideally removed, or if that is not possible, then the
potential losses are insured. In terms of contingency planning for risk, well-
prepared organisations will develop policies to deal with a range of hazards from
‘natural’, through technological accidents, to malicious or erroneous damage
caused by the actions of employees or external agents. Such policies invariably
seek to ensure a coordinated, efficient and effective response to situations that
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arise, and staff will be trained (to some extent) to respond to such situations
(Smith, 2000 and 2004).
An important consideration within the risk management process is how the
activities and information flows that occur within the organisation are controlled
through the (risk) management function and the limitations associated with that
process. Figure 1 shows the relationship between three employees: a manager
(designated as ‘M’) and two members of staff (‘A’ and ‘B’). A great deal of
management theory and practice tends to assume that sufficient information
will be captured through formal processes, and that early warning signals about
potential problems will also be captured in this way (Brookfield and Smith, 2007).
As such, this conforms what Seidl terms the ‘structures of observation’ – which
leads to those elements of organisational performance that are observed (the
zone of observability) and those that are effectively ignored (the zone of non-
observability) (Merton, 1957; and Seidl, 2007). These ‘structures of observation’
involve two considerations: the first concerns how such structures can shape
observations and the second concerns how these observations relate to each other
across time and place (Seidl, 2007). Knowledge also provides the mechanism by
which certain observations are excluded and Seidl argues that:
knowledge is a selection of certain (generalized) distinctions for observation from all
possible ones. Thus, the reverse side of knowledge is an exclusion of distinctions for
observation; an exclusion of possibilities of observation (Seidl, 2007, p. 20).
Figure 1
Elements of Organisations
C© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
264 FISCHBACHER-SMITH AND FISCHBACHER-SMITH
Management will invariably seek to shape the nature of observations and the
processes around knowledge creation and transfer. Invariably, this is seen
as taking place through formal managerial processes and the bureaucratic
functions of the organisation, rather than through any informal processes. In
reality, however, a considerable amount of information is exchanged informally
between employees and may bypass formal management mechanisms/functions.
The logical extension of this argument is that at any point in time, managers
will have incomplete information around discussions pertinent to risk and, more
importantly, may fail to identify information that would point to early warnings
of impending failure. In some respects, these early warnings may be missed as
a result of what Seidl (2007) terms non-knowledge and the exclusion of certain
forms of observation. Similarly, the leakage of information and knowledge
outside of the organisation can bypass existing control mechanisms and be used
to generate harm for the organisation through direct and malicious actions by
outsiders. The insider threats are increasingly seen as important due to the
threats from espionage (both commercial and state), terrorism, and organised
crime. Inevitably, such processes are also (or aspire to be) invisible to detection
and therefore also to management. When one considers that there is a normal
degree of misbehaviour within organisations such as bending rules, cutting
corners, bypassing ‘unnecessary’ bureaucracy (see Ackroyd and Thompson,
1999), then it requires little imagination to see how intentional harm may be
caused by those with malicious intent seeking to exploit weaknesses.
Although managers are likely to want to create structures where they
themselves become the key connector between individuals, in reality, situations
are more complex for various reasons. Firstly, and particularly in healthcare,
multidisciplinary teams, integrated services and managed clinical networks for
example, all require team-wide formal communications and the ability of team
members, who may not all be employed by one organisation, to take devolved
decisions along the lines of their professional training, autonomy and judgement.
It may be, for example, that a social worker and community psychiatric nurse
(employed by the NHS and Council/Local Authority respectively) need to
undertake a joint visit to a patient in the patient’s own home. Their decision
making will be influenced by their training, the particular circumstances, the
health and wellbeing of the patient, any informal ‘modus operandi’ that the two
individuals have reached after working together over time, any relationship of
trust, and prior knowledge of the patient or locality. Such dimensions do not
fall within the structures of observation to any great extent despite the role
of formal inter-agency protocols and the extensive documentation of visits and
assessments.
Their manager(s) will be geographically and temporally remote from that
decision so will have limited control over the nature of their interaction, little
opportunity to identify the existence of an informal relationship between them
and therefore, limited opportunity to capture the information shared. In the
majority of cases, this will not give rise to a crisis and whilst it may render the
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manager a less socialised perspective of their own area of responsibility, day to
day service may be provided to a high level and patient needs met. However,
there are sadly cases where difficulties arise and crises do emerge. One need
only read the newspapers to hear frequently of cases where a patient has injured
someone, where the patient was known to health and care services and where,
‘poor communication’ is deemed to have allowed the situation to occur and
indeed to escalate to the point that it has. The issue then is how, and indeed
if, it is possible for a manager to ever be able to capture or ensure that key
knowledge in a situation like that is communicated and acted on appropriately.
Whenmultiplied to consider the exponential number of informal relationships
within and between organisations in which risk-related issues might be
communicated, the challenge to organisations and their managers dealing with
risk grows significantly. Figure 2 captures the formal risk analysis processes
between teams (within or between organisations). It also identifies the informal
communications (dotted lines between A and B) and the way in which they feed
into wider sets of informal network communications they engage in.
The challenge for organisations is that where multiple departments or
organisations are linked together, the focus is normally on formal risk analysis
processes which will, in turn, be based on the structures of observation that are
in place within the organisation(s) involved in delivering a service or responding
to a crisis where it occurs. The structures of observation will help to shape
perceptions of the range of anticipated events and any worst-case scenario. The
Figure 2
Knowledge Transfers Around Early Warnings
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outer interactions within Figure 2 are largely of an informal nature and may
capture information that is present within the zone of non-observability. As the
informal networks extend beyond the span of formal controls, early warnings
(often fairly weak signals) are not likely to be identified in an effective manner.
Many of the information flows and communication processes that take place
within organisations occur informally. Colleagues share with their peer groups
the shortcomings of processes, the inadequacy of information, the limitations
of data, the distortions within management information systems, and yet often,
managers themselves are unwilling to acknowledge such shortcomings and so
do not recognise the potential for failure. Interactions between individuals ‘A’
and ‘B’ are typically interpreted by managers through the lenses of formal
organisational structures and formal reporting mechanisms, to the neglect of
the informal, yet, as the dotted lines in Figure 1 denote, it is likely that there will
be multiple informal communications between ‘A’ and ‘B’, and these potentially
transcend formal boundaries as discussed above. Bureaucratic processes will
therefore inevitably fail to capture the detail of early warnings and will often
prove to be too slow to react when these warnings are captured. They may also be
unable to contain the flow of sensitive information outside of the organisation.
Overly-bureaucratic environments may also cause individuals to violate (in order
to get the job done), thereby moving the organisation closer to the potential for
failure whilst allowing managers to believe that their perceived higher levels of
controls will guarantee increased safety (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Reason,
1990 and1997; Weick, 2001; and Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001).
This process is shown in simplified manner in Figure 2, where a set of
interactions take place that lie outside of the normal sphere of managerial
control and which generate a perception of order in a situation where the
reality is disorder. It is within these informal relations that a great deal may
be discussed about the organisation, about the range of tasks and activities
undertaken (e.g., discussion of management’s approach to a particular project)
and that will thereby generate considerable potential for sharing essential
knowledge about hazard and risk. The organisation’s inability to capture this
information will inhibit its ability to prevent crises as this informal system is
an essential transmitter and creator of knowledge around risk. Unfortunately,
the formal processes surrounding risk assessment will often not take account
of these informal networks (as a source of early warning information) as they
sit outside of the structures of observation imposed by the organisation. Thus,
early warnings and weak signals shared within these informal networks will not
be captured by the organisation. In response to these problems and information
asymmetries, many organisations seek to add multiple layers of controls and
build further redundancy into the system in order to prevent failures from
escalating. However, not only can such approaches bring with them problems
around the escalation of risk (through processes of emergence) but they serve
to make the system more opaque and therefore more difficult to manage. These
additional layers of control are also no better able to deal with unobservability.
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If systems designers and those involved in managerial and accounting control
functions do not consider certain elements to be important then they will remain
marginalised and essentially unobserved. During the horsemeat crisis in the
UK, for example, a senior manager within a large food retailer observed that
the industry does not routinely check for the DNA of some animals and so its
presence or absence is never verified. Many organisational controls are based
on such assumptions. The underlying problem of hidden networks of knowledge
therefore remains.
A NETWORK PERSPECTIVE ON CRISES AND VULNERABILITY
The myriad relationships perpetuated by globalisation and by government
approaches to involving private sector providers in the delivery of public services
mean that all aspects of the design, delivery, management and measurement of
product and service delivery ultimately need to be considered from a network
perspective (Kickert et al., 1997). Organisational performance is deemed to
be improved through the increased flexibility and responsiveness afforded by
carefully designed inter-organisational relationships and by improvements in
the transparency, auditability and governance of information within that process
(de Bruijn, 2007). Other alleged benefits include quicker decision making
processes, improved communications and a reduced emphasis on command and
control. A concomitant focus on core business activities and efficient means of
delivery has frequently resulted in efficient internal and external networks that
allow for ‘just in time’ delivery and lean production. Better integration is thought
to reduce duplication, improve the efficiency of resource allocation and resource
utilisation, and to ensure that decisions are taken close to the consumer, i.e., at
the locus of service provision.
Paradoxically, the same networks that generate these efficiencies for organisa-
tions in terms of the speed of interaction and the extent of the supply chain, also
generate problems. Networks have brought with them the potential for failures
to migrate quickly through the ‘tightly coupled’ and ‘interactively complex’
(Perrow, 1984) nature of the organisation as a system. In this way, ‘just-in-
time’ processes can easily become ‘just-too-late’ (Smith, 2005b) as organisations
no longer have the resource slack that they need to deal with surges in task
demands. The capacity of a regional health authority to respond to a disease
outbreak or a major incident, for example, is often largely contingent on its
resource slack, and the effectiveness of its emergency planning arrangements
with other agencies. Where the communication of information, decision-making,
the utilisation of resources, and the network infrastructures that support them
are inefficient or ill informed, then an existing crisis can escalate quickly across
that system and exceed the capabilities of service providers to deliver what is
necessary despite contingency arrangements (Smith, 2005a).
The central role of public-private supply chain networks within a highly
globalised industry raises some significant challenges for public management
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regulatory systems, especially in a period of intense cutbacks and austerity.
What is clear from a consideration of several crises in recent years is that any
weaknesses in state regulatory systems at the national level can have a major
impact on vulnerabilities within the single market of the European Union. As
this economic trading block increases its membership and given the differential
impacts of the economic downturn across this economic landscape, we should
not be surprised that the various state regulatory agencies differ in terms of
their performance. Clearly, the contamination of the food chain by horsemeat
is indicative of this problem.
The emergence of the breast implant case in late 2011 and early 2012
also illustrated how the interconnected nature of organisations can generate
problems, in this case, arising from unethical behaviours, to have a deleterious
effect on other organisations in the network. The use of non-medical grade
silicone by the French-based company PIP and the subsequent concerns of
women who had them fitted, resulted in a crisis that spread throughout Europe
and internationally (Keogh, 2012). In the UK, the crisis prompted a government
assessment of the safety of PIP implants (Keogh, 2012) and, despite the low level
of calculated risk, there was considerable pressure placed on private providers to
remove implants (O’Dowd, 2011a and 2011b; and Templeton and Follain, 2012).
As many of these implants were part of a cosmetic procedure, they were carried
out privately. For those implants carried out by the NHS, an undertaking was
given to replace them.
Both cases also illustrate the impacts of a de-regulation culture and an
associated erosion of regulatory capability around monitoring and enforcement.
Within an age of austerity, this erosion of regulatory capability can be seen
to decrease the chances of the state being able to detect violations and may,
at the same time, increase the pressures on organisations within the supply
chain to violate in an attempt to maximise profitability. Within such a context,
warnings around violations are more likely to emerge from informal networks
and whistleblowing rather than through inspection regimes. The deaths at
mid-Stafforsdhire hospital serve as an illustration of the failures in regulatory
processes to identify poor performance around patient safety and to learn
effective lessons from such events (Francis, 2010; Ocloo and Fulop, 2012; and
Reid and Catchpole, 2011). Both the PIP and horsemeat contamination examples
also illustrate the role of trust within the regulation of risk across extended
supply chains and networks. At the core of this is how receiving elements within
a supply chain assume that the products received into their own processes meet
the standards required. Invariably, this involves some degree of trust between
members of the supply chain network; often supported by informal relationships
that evolve over time.
The challenge for public management is therefore how to leverage informal
networks when the formal regulatory mechanisms are degraded and how
to understand and manage the informal dimension of inter-organisational
networks so as to minimise their vulnerabilities. Yet our understanding and
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management of formal and informal networks and network performance is
demanding both conceptually and practically, meaning there is as yet, limited
research-based insight for public managers to draw upon in practice. Attention
has typically been given to aspects of inter-agency collaboration such as
sustaining collaborative effort, achieving collaborative advantage and evalu-
ating the success of such endeavours (Head, 2008; Huxham and Vangen,
2005; Jaaskelainen and Lonnqvist, 2011; and Rodan and Galunic, 2004)
rather than with the management of informal networks and their impact
on the generation and migration of crises across organisations, spaces and
places.
Socio-technical networks generally, and informal networks in particular, are
not routinely seen as a source of vulnerability and much of the literature
emphasises the benefits derived from social interactions and relationships.
These include the rapid dissemination of information, the communication of
tacit knowledge, potential improvements in organisational performance, and the
ability to quickly galvanize interest and support where networks are supported
by communications structures (Borgatti and Foster, 2003; and Gnyawali and
Madhavan, 2001).
There is, therefore, a double-edged aspect to socio-technical networks: they
can both allow risks to escalate and can provide organisations with a degree
of resilience around crisis prevention. The more resilient an organisation can
become, the more effective it should be in picking up on, and dealing with, early
warnings. It becomes important therefore to understand how such hazards,
and the risk of these hazards, can be affected by, and also affect, socio-
technical networks within and between organisations. However, as we go on
now to explore, much of the interaction within socio-technical networks is
informal and frequently hidden presenting significant challenges to managers
and accountants seeking to ensure transparency, probity and accountability.
HIDDEN AND INFORMAL NETWORKS
Networks transcend formal organisational boundaries and formal means of
observation and control. They are also usually characterised by elaborated codes
(Bernstein, 1966) representing the language used by expert groups within the
network. These codes are often impenetrable by those outside of the expert
group and serve as a barrier to discourse. At its core, knowledge is constructed
(or rejected) as a function of how we make sense of what we ‘observe’ in the
world around us (Weick, 2001; and Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). We tend to select
or accept information that suits our needs, and that we recognise as relevant
to our interests (Boisot, 1995; Collingridge and Reeve, 1986; and Taylor, 2000).
In part, this sensemaking process is shaped by the values and core beliefs that
we hold. For example, in a healthcare setting, clinical staff may readily identify
and accept information that reinforces their views on particular approaches to
patient care, but be much less receptive to (and thus pay less attention to)
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information about cost, purchasing options or managerial incentives. As Powell
observes:
The most useful information is rarely that which flows down the formal chain of
command in an organisation or that which can be inferred from shifting price signals.
Rather, it is that which is obtained from someone whom you have dealt with in the
past and found to be reliable. You trust best information that comes from someone
you know well (Powell, 1991).
Thus, informal networks may become powerful conduits of knowledge that is
often deemed to supersede or negate organisationally-produced knowledge. Such
exchanges are, however, largely hidden and thus evade the normal management
and control processes within organisations.
Seidl (2007) argues that observation and knowledge are linked but they are
not the same thing:
. . . knowledge is something that guides observation. That is, it is something that in
the concrete moments of observation provides an orientation for where to draw the
distinction. In that sense, we can parallel knowledge with structures of observation (Seidl,
2007, p.19).
How we define and frame a problem will largely determine how we observe and
perceive it and this will, in turn, shape our response to it. Informal networks can,
however, allow for ‘non-knowledge’ (Seidl, 2007) to be challenged, as evidence
from other contexts and other perspectives is brought to bear on the constrained
observations that are codified within organisations. Professional bodies are a key
conduit for this process as they provide a range of mechanisms for information
sharing and networking. The issue then becomes one of whether the organisation
absorbs and responds to this knowledge. The interactions between individuals
generate a set of connecting fabrics that both exist, and are perpetuated beyond,
the control and sphere of any single organisation.
In these ‘spaces’, knowledge is created and disseminated and serves to shape
the views and behaviours of individuals within the network. This, in turn, creates
social capital and knowledge that is the possession of the individual (and the
network) and not, necessarily, their employer. Not all of this information is
necessarily actionable. For example, local authority education staff who deal
with vulnerable children come to know the children’s circumstances well, often
develop informal ties with staff in related agencies such as healthcare, social
care, schools and the police. This is particularly the case around those families
where there are anti-social behaviour or addiction problems such that families
are brought into contact with multiple agencies. During informal exchanges,
background information is often passed between individuals that is not officially
permissible (due to client confidentiality) but which front line staff value and
deem necessary to effectively undertaking their role. Such communications can
result in interventions (under other auspices) that avert a potential crisis. It
is also conceivable though that within the network space there is also the
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potential for disinformation and failure as the knowledge communicated may
be inaccurate, decontextualized, or out of date, thereby leading to inappropriate
actions. Such failures can migrate quickly and create multiple ‘pathways of
vulnerability’ (Smith, 2005b) in which the potential for failure can be embedded
and remain undetected across a range of connected organisations. These
pathways are an extension of Turner’s (1976 and 1978) notion of incubation and
Reason’s (1990) resident pathogens by elevating the importance of space, place
and time in both the generation of failure (failure modes and probabilities)
and its ‘complexion’ (failure consequences and cascades). If we consider the
failures that can be generated within (supply chain) networks then it is possible
to see organisations as having multiple ‘pathways of vulnerability’ embedded
within their sphere of operations. Many of these pathways will originate outside
of the organisation’s formal boundaries but will have consequences within
them. Informal networks are, therefore, an important but essentially neglected
element of an organisation’s risk portfolio as there is a largely under-explored
‘dark side’ to them.
DECISION MAKING: DEVELOPING CONTINGENCIES AND MANAGING CRISES
The managerial limitations we have highlighted so far create both intra- and
inter-organisational vulnerabilities. The gaps in knowledge combined with an
inability to observe and control much of the communication and knowledge
concerning technical and non-technical issues, will serve to create holes in
organisational defences. Reason (1990) argues that these gaps may become
aligned with gaps in other parts of the organisation, creating vulnerabilities at a
number of levels within the organisation. Where gaps become aligned due to the
range of issues noted previously with regards to information, communication,
error reporting behaviours, hierarchy and so forth, then latent error pathways
are created such that hazards can permeate through the organisation(s) and its
networks, thereby creating significant losses in terms of control, reputation, and
service provision. At its worst in a healthcare context, this means an adverse
event in hospital, failure to respond to a community crisis on time, poor diagnosis
and inappropriate pathways of care or the death of a patient or innocent victim
(Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith, 2009). A multi-agency network thus
potentially incubates a significant risk of destabilising a number of organisations
simultaneously or in a domino effect. As a consequence of these non-observed
networks, there will be information about the various risks that are generated
as part of the organisation’s activities that is not captured by managerial control
systems i.e., through the formal processes. The essential issue here is that at
any point in time, the risks that are identified and measured within a formal
process will represent only a proportion of the hazards that are faced by the
organisation.
There are important implications for contingency planning given this line
of argument. Organisations’ contingency planning processes will generally be
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based on the formal interactions that are measured and managed. Senior staff
who typically develop contingency responses, will rely on formal information and
data analysis to calculate capacity and to determine a portfolio of risks, typically
informed by a local risk register. Informal communications amongst those who
deliver services, may present quite different accounts of capacity, knowledge,
understanding, decision making and communication pathways that will render
some contingency planning assumptions invalid. This means conditions may
arise that move the organisation beyond its contingency limits and outside
of the scope of the plans that are put into place to deal with serious
adverse events (Smith, 2005a). Thus, although it is often assumed that the
identification of risk and the development of associated contingency plans
is largely sufficient to deal with any ensuing crisis or hazardous situation,
it is more likely to be the case that there will be various circumstances in
which this proves to be a grossly inadequate assumption. It is not unlikely
given our argument above, that a healthcare provider would quickly find that
many of its assumptions were inadequate during contingency planning activities
and that a crisis situation therefore quickly escalates beyond the contingency
limits. Moreover, given the networked nature of organisations, as the PIP case
illustrates, events combine and create emergent conditions that are unexpected
and uncontrolled, taking the organisation(s) beyond anticipated and controlled
limits.
It is at this point that we again recognise the dual role of informal networks.
When the organisation is dealing with issues that have been anticipated and
are within the scope of the contingency response, they will marshal teams of
staff, commandeer equipment and take up residence in premises within their
control centres to house crisis teams. The level of mobilisation will vary between
organisations and there will be a concerted process of monitoring and evaluation
that is aimed at preventing the ‘event’ from escalating further (Smith, 2000 and
2004). The extent of this crisis management process will, of course also be
shaped by the ‘structures of observation’ (Seidl, 2007) that are in place. At
this stage, one of two things may occur. The event may escalate but nonetheless
retain certain characterstics that are conceivable within the dominant paradigm,
although this does not make them readily manageable. It is also the case,
however, that scenarios may occur that challenge the dominant paradigm within
the organisation. They may not have been accepted by management prior to
the crisis (e.g., the idea that NHS doctors might commit a terrorist attack),
as the evidence-base to support such a challenge had not been accumulated
by the formal processes. In both situations, informal networks can play an
important role in allowing crisis management team members to leverage the
knowledge and resource bases that exist within their informal networks and
to alleviate the crisis, preventing further escalation. These informal networks
could provide management with (indirect) access to expertise and knowledge
held by people outside of the formal crisis teams. A key consideration will also
be the ability of informal networks to challenge the organisational paradigm
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following the event. It will be interesting to see how the medical devices sector
responds in the wake of the PIP case and increasing calls for a tighter regulatory
enforcement regime.
HUMAN NETWORK CHALLENGES TO MANAGERIAL CONTROL
How organisations manage the knowledge that is present within their control,
and how they deal with the more informally generated knowledge that exists
within the hidden networks that permeate the organisation is an essential
consideration. It is increasingly the case that organisations must be sensitive
to both internal and external signals, and as a consequence must find a
means of capturing information throughout and beyond the organisation. An
effective transfer of knowledge between organisational members, along with
the challenges made to core assumptions in the process, should allow for a
more effective crisis response capability, especially around early warnings. Such
a perspective invariably takes the view that the essential knowledge needed
to run the organisation is distributed across the organisation and is not just
concentrated at the senior management level of the organisation.
Another important aspect of informal, hidden networks is that highly sensitive
information that is essential to organisational performance may find more
opportunities for ‘leakage’ or, in some cases, early warnings of problems might
not be picked up by those who are in a position to take action to prevent
escalation. The development and maintenance of lines of communication
between members of the organisation, needs therefore, to be a key focus of
managerial attention. Whilst many organisations would agree with this, there
are several important barriers to effective implementation, especially when
dealing with issues around risk.
Firstly, risk assessment by its very nature involves predicting the likelihood
of an event occurring and taking subsequent steps to mitigate those risks.
Prediction is based on both known and unknown factors, and thus the
organisation’s ability to capture relevant information and make informed
judgements on which to base their predictions, becomes essential. Much of this
information is, however, complex and requires interpretation and analysis by
experts. Much of it also lies within the zone of unobservability, exchanged within
hidden networks. This interpretation may, under certain conditions, generate
the potential for future risks as the decisions taken on the basis of a flawed
perspective will serve to shape the control methods put into place.
A second issue, and one that is also important in relation to issues
of expertise, is the hierarchy within which information is collated, shared,
analysed and disseminated. If error reporting is initiated by a relatively junior
member of staff within an organisation that is characterised by professional
hierarchy, then the problems of authority gradients can be a significant
factor in preventing information flows and subsequent action. Such hierarchies
are common to a range of industries such as healthcare, engineering and
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airlines. In some circumstances the power-dynamics within organisations can
mean that errors are either not reported (as frontline, junior, staff may
feel unable to challenge higher level decisions), or are ignored because the
reporter is deemed to be inexperienced or a non-expert. Yet again, the issues
will commonly be well-known and communicated among informal but hidden
networks.
A third issue concerns the problem associated with constrained boundaries
of consideration amongst decision makers who tend not to consider issues
beyond the short term. They prioritise the requirement to deal with immediate
problems at the expense of the possible long-term cost. These factors, combined
with the issues around determining the legitimacy of knowledge and the social
construction of risks, generate challenges to the ways in which organisations
deal with risk and crisis. The problem becomes compounded when we consider
the impact of such problems across the multi-organisational networks that
characterise public services such as health and social care. What is less
comprehensively acknowledged is the significance that these issues will have
within the wider inter-organisational context in which both risk and crisis
occur and are transmitted (Smith and Irwin, 2006). A crisis may no longer be
confined to one organisation and there is a clear potential inter-agency effect as
organisations become more tightly coupled (Perrow, 1984) to each other through
complex supply chain networks. What is becoming increasingly clear as a result
is:
that in a highly interconnected world, the actions of other organisations may also play
an important role in the development and migration of crisis potential (Smith and
Barton, 2007, p. 65).
Thus, it is also the case that the ability of one organisation to respond to a
crisis situation will potentially enable or disable others within the network, as
supply and value chains generate the potential for common mode failures or as
critical national and international infrastructures become vulnerable to external
attack and failures (Boin and Smith, 2006). The issues here also relate to the
limits of managerial control across boundaries and to the interaction effects of
one organisation’s performance on another under conditions of crisis. The latter
relates very much to the collective capacity of inter-connected organisations –
the ability to perform in what Kauffman terms a ‘fitness landscape’ (Kauffman,
1993), but such issues go beyond the scope of this paper.
CONCLUSIONS
Our aim in this paper has been to set out the problem space for information
capture and analysis within organisations. We have tried to frame the
information terrain in terms of what is measured (because that is invariably
what is managed) and what is unobserved. It is these unobserved spaces that
generate the dark territory within organisations and which serve to allow crises
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to be generated. In the crisis of legitimation that follows every crisis, it is
invariably the unobserved aspects of the organisation that are held up as key
factors in shaping the evolution and escalation of the crisis. Often these issues,
unobservable interactions and knowledge exchanges will have conveyed some
form of early warning but the warning will have been missed or rejected as
having little or no importance in determining organisational performance. The
concerns expressed within informal networks are thus strangled at birth by
a formal system that both fails to recognise their significance and is almost
incapable of dealing with them because no structures and processes are available
to ‘manage’ them. Even after a crisis, organisations often display a degree of
paradigm blindness towards the issues (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012).
Organisations embody informal relationships that are beyond their physical,
political, economic, andmanagerial boundaries. They are, therefore beyondman-
agerial control and yet significantly influence organisations acting individually
and collectively. Although informal networks are hugely beneficial in terms of
organisational performance, especially in complex systems such as healthcare,
the problems associated with structures of observation are significant. They are
also likely to be compounded across organisational boundaries, yet there has been
relatively little consideration of how informal networks may have the capacity
for self-harm through quickly transmitting errors via uncontrolled social means
of communication. Similarly, there has been little attention on how they might
create vulnerabilities for the organisations who are embedded within a set of
tightly-coupled linkages.
As economies move increasingly towards mixed forms of public, private and
third sector provision of public services, it is essential that this interconnectivity
is recognised and understood. Given that organisations will seek to perform at
optimal levels, their ability to identify and manage error or hazard potential
is crucial. In their attempts to do so, informal networks become significant to
the performance of individual organisations. Where network communications
are inadequate, informal networks will exacerbate individual organisations’
vulnerabilities such that the network as a whole contains penetrable layers
of vulnerability.
This paper has argued that the limits to managerial control within organ-
isations are such that the informal networks between individuals within and
across organisations may serve to bypass established internal systems designed
to reduce the organisation’s vulnerability to external hazard. The challenge
for professionals and managers within organisations is, therefore, to recognise
and reconceptualise the destructive capacity of informal networks (the ‘dark’
side of networks), particularly in light of the non-knowledge or unobservable
transmission of information that is nonetheless strategically and operationally
essential to organisations in terms of protection and mitigation of risk. The
argument is not intended to negate the role of managers or to suggest that efforts
to identify and manage a risk portfolio are fruitless. Rather, we propose that
the mindset towards sources of risk be adapted to recognise the vulnerabilities
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that (could) exist within an organisation’s set of network linkages. Moreover,
we suggest that managers recognise the vulnerabilities generated due to non-
knowledge such that greater awareness is created within organisations of the
potential for informal networks to identify and generate risk. We also argue
that in considering organisational responses to crisis situations, that crisis
management strategies take more conscious account of the inter-dependence of
organisations, and the extent to which the underperformance of one organisation
within the network, may be detrimental to the survival of others.
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